Despite the apparent easiness of the task, it is rather hard to translate the term “think tank” into Russian. The most frequent translation is “analitecheskiy center” or analytical center. However, the variations you might find also include: “komissiya expertov” (expert commission), “fabrika mysley” (factory of thoughts) and even “mozgovoy center” (brain center). This short linguistic introduction is here to illustrate the existing ambiguity in the Russian understanding of what a think tank is and what it does.
This ambiguity has its roots in the variability of think tanks in Russia. For example, in the think tank index report 2015 +, we can find some very different organizations: Carnegie Moscow Center (National subsidiary of a foreign NGO), Institute of World Economy and International Relations (research institute of Russian Academy of Sciences), Moscow State Institute of International Relations (an actual university), Analytical Center for the Government of the Russian Federation (a government agency), etc. Also, one of the biggest Russian self-proclaimed analytical centers “Valdai” is actually an international discussion club – a Kremlin associated platform where Russian and foreign political and economic experts meet, and where president Putin tends to give his speeches at least once a year.
The four landmarks of the Russian think tank community
I argue that there are four landmarks defining the modern think tank industry in Russia. First, the so called “Perestroika” of the end of 1980s – the attempt of reforming the Soviet political system by Mikhail Gorbachev. That was the first time the Russian national government relied on the advice of the academic expert community. Many of these experts (such as Zaslavskaya, Primakov or Abalkin) became prominent thinktankers and even top-tier government officials later in the 1990s.
Second, the 1990s – the golden age of Russian think tanks.
The national market reforms and huge regional elections gave an opportunity for many political and economic experts to establish their own institutions. The atmosphere of change and transition facilitated by the federal authorities allowed many foreign NGOs (such as Carnegie Center or Open Society Foundations) to come to Russia. Besides, the recently created business structures proved to be independent actors that needed political representation and expert advice on the matter of achieving power and adaptation to the rapidly changing free market.
Third, the color revolutions of the beginning of 2000s (The Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 and the Tulip Revolution in Kirghizstan in 2005). At the start of the millennia, the Russian government, under Putin, recognized a new threat: a series of peaceful protests in post-soviet countries, which led to the overthrow of authoritarian political regimes in those countries. Therefore, the Russian government started to tighten its grip on the media and the NGO sector. With the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the dismantling of “Open Russia”,+ the seizure of NTV, +, etc., the Russian government drew a line between economics and politics- a line it didn’t want anyone to cross. For think tanks, it meant that as far as they limited their advice solely to economic matters, they were safe from government harassment and were even listened to occasionally. This is when the number of economic think tanks rose. They successfully adapted to this new reality and built the necessary working relations with the government, such as the Economic Expert Group (EEG) or the Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
Finally, the Russian “foreign agent” law of 2012. This law started a new chapter for the relationship between the Russian government and think tanks. The foreign agent law obliges all NGOs that are involved in politics and accept foreign donations to register themselves as “foreign agents,” understood as organizations which allegedly promote the interests of foreign powers in Russia (the reference to the Soviet anti-capitalist propaganda). However, this law quickly went beyond its initially declared purposes and began labeling as foreign agents not just independent think tanks, like Levada Center, but also large NGOs, such as the MacArthur Foundation and the “Dynasty” educational foundation, even though the political engagement of the latter was limited to several Social Science lectures. +(At the moment of publication, INDEM’s website stopped being available).
Conclusions
Today, the Russian think tank community is rather large and developed. Most of the existing organizations have found their niche and successfully occupied it being that economic, political, PR analysis, Human Rights, corruption investigations, etc. However, Kremlin’s growing authoritarian tendencies seriously hurt the internal client base of think tanks, made the international cooperation almost impossible and guarantee no personal security to thinktankers unless they send clear signals about their loyalty to the current political regime.
The existing threat to fall under the foreign agent law leaves an average Russian think tank only with three options. First, to erase almost all of the national political issues from one’s agenda, and concentrate on national economy, elections in other countries, or historical issues. Second, to lower one’s objectivity standards and try to profit from the image of a Kremlin’s insider. Third, to turn down all of one’s international donors and rely financially on the internal clients (who might also have legal troubles supporting a truly independent NGO) or fundraising. Overall, the future perspectives of the think tank community in Russia are unfavorable, and it is not going to change any time soon.